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N. P. Ins. Co. 25 Barb. 189; Bodine v. Ins. Co. 51 N. Y. 117; May,
Ins. § 340. A condition may be waived by parol, although there is a
clause in the policy saying that no condition can be waived except in
writing. Carson v. Ins. Co. 43 N. J. Law, 300; S. C. 39 Amer. Rep.
584; Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234; Thompson v. Ins. Co. 104 U. S.
252; Phoenic Ins. Co. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 35; S. C. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18.
There was sufficient evidence of waiver to give the case to the jury.
Coursin v. Penn. Ins. Co. 46 Pa. St. 323; Patterson v. In 8. Co. 22
Pittsb. L. J. 205. The learned judge should have admitted plaintiff's
offer to show that it was a general custom among insurance compa
nies and brokers to issue policies without requring payment of pre
mium, even when there is a clause of limitation similar to the one in
this case. Helme v. Phila. Life Ins. Co. 61 Pa. St. 107; Girard v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. 86 Pa. St. 236; Barter v. Massasoit Ins. Co. 13
Allen, 320; Pino v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 19 La. Ann. 214; Union
Cent. Ins. Co. v. Pottker, 33 Ohio St. 459.
Fleming & McCarrell, contra.
This case is settled by Pottsville M. I. Co. v. Min. Sp. Imp. Co.
100 Pa. St. 137.
BY THE CourtT. The motion is refused.
DAVEY v. AETNA LIFE INs. Co.
(Circuit Court, D. New Jersey. January, 1884.)
1. LIFE INSURANCE—UNTRUE ANswer—Use of INToxic ATING LIQUors.
An untrue answer to a question in the application regarding the use of in
toxicating liquors will avoid the policy, where the application is part of the
COntract.
2. SAME–IMPAIRMENT of HEALTH–USE of STIMULANTs—PHYSICIAN's CERTIFI
CATE.
The policy provides that if the insured should become so far intemperate as
to impair his health, it should be void. The attending physician certified that
he was in the habit of using stimulants and tobacco, and probably they im
paired his health. Held, that while the certificate must not be taken as evi
dence of the truth of the fact stated, it is a suggestion entitled to weight in
considering the justification of resistance by the company.
3. SAME–BREACH of WARRANTY.
A substantially untrue answer, where the application is part of the policy, is
a breach of warranty which avoids the policy. It is of no consequence whether
the question be material or not.
4. SAME–INTEMPERANCE—DELIRIUM TREMENs.
The condition that if the insured should become so far intemperate as to im
pair his health, the policy would be void, is a condition subsequent whose
breach involves a forfeiture. Delirium tremens from intemperance would
amount to a forfeiture.
5. SAME—IMPAIRMENT OF HEALTH.
Impairment of health is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and need not be
ermanent. Habitual intemperance is not necessary, so long as his health is
mpaired.
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6. SAME—DEATH CAUSED WHolly or PARTLY FROM INToxic ATING LIQUors.
If death resulted wholly or partly from the use of intoxicating liquors, the
policy is void.
At Law.
John Linn, for plaintiff.
Theron G. Strong, for defendant; A. Q. Keasbey, of counsel.
McKENNAN, J., (charging jury.) On the sixteenth of July, 1878,
William A. Davey entered into a contract with the AEtna Life Insur
ance Company, of Hartford, Connecticut, whereby, in consideration
of the annual payment of $233.60, to be paid on or before the six
teenth day of July in each year during his life, the AEtna Life Insur
ance Company stipulated to pay to Ada Davey, within 90 days after
notice of the death of William A. Davey, the sum of $10,000. The first








the policy; the three subsequent premiums were paid at the time
when they severally became due. On the sixth o
f August, 1881,Will
iam A
. Davey died, and on the sixteenth of August what are called
proofs o
f death, dated o
n
the thirteenth o
f August, 1881, were de
livered to the AEtna Life Insurance Company. Thereupon the plaintiff
in this case, and beneficiary under this policy, claimed that the in
surance company was bound to pay her the amount stated in the
policy, the sum o
f $10,000, with interest after 9






f Mr. Davey's death, about the sixteenth o
f
November. These facts were proved b
y
the plaintiff, and, indeed,
there is no contest between the parties as to the proof thereof; and
therefore, apparently, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of
this policy unless some sufficient reason is shown b
y
the defendant
why it should not be required to pay that amount. The right of the
plaintiff to the amount, and the liability o
r obligation of the defendant
to pay the amount stated in the policy, are dependent upon certain
clauses and stipulations and conditions of this policy, the breach o
r




the reason why it




is what is called an application, which contains answers
to numerous questions and statements o
f facts, which the parties
have agreed and stipulated shall be regarded as part of the contract,
and to the absolute truth o
f
which the insured bound himself. So
that every statement o
f
fact contained in this application the insured





there was any inadvertent o
r unintentional mistake.
It is alleged in the first place by the defendant that an answer of
William A
. Davey to a question found in this application was untrue,
and therefore, b
y
the express terms o
f
the contract, it was absolved
from any liability to pay anything on this policy. That question is
a
s follows: “Has the party ever been addicted to the excessive or in
temperate use o
f any alcoholic stimulants o




r daily 2” The answer to that is “No,” which im
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parted the information that he has never been addicted to the excess
ive use of any alcoholic liquor or opium, and that he did not then, at
the time of the answering of this question, habitually use any of them
often or daily. You will observe, gentlemen of the jury, that this re
lates to the condition of things existing at the time of the execution or
signing of this application, July 16, 1878. It relates to the habits
and course of life of William A. Davey at that time. He is bound by
his contract to make a truthful answer to that question, and if it is
in any sense untrue, the contract between him and the insurance com
pany was void, and cannot be the basis of any claim for the amount
stated in the policy. You will consider the evidence which has been
produced here by the defendant to support the allegation made that
the answer is untrue. I do not intend to advert to it in detail, or
more than in the most general way, but simply to say to you that you
must be satisfied, from the evidence produced by the defendant before
you, (because the burden is upon the defendant,) that at the time when
this question was answered by Mr. Davey he either had been ad
dicted to the excessive or intemperate use of alcoholic stimulants or
opium, or that he was at that time in the habit of the frequent or daily
use of it
.
If you are so satisfied, why then the answer was untrue,
the contract void, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the
amount o
f this policy.
The second ground of the defense is that this policy, on its face, is
made subject to a number o
f
conditions. They are recited in detail
in the third clause of the policy. Among them is the condition that
if he (William A. Davey) shall become so far intemperate as to im
pair his health, or induce delirium tremens, the company shall be ab
solved from any liability to pay the amount agreed to be paid b
y
this
policy of insurance. This, you will observe, gentlemen, relates to the
habits and course o
f life of the insured after the delivery of this pol
icy. In effect he agrees that he will pursue a temperate course of
life, or at least will not indulge so far in the use of alcoholic liquor
a
s
to impair his health or induce delirium tremens, and in case he
does, why the contract between him and the company is void. And
this, gentlemen, you will perhaps regard as the most serious inquiry
imposed upon you under the testimony in this case. In the first
place it is incumbent upon the beneficiary under this policy of insur
ance, Mrs. Davey, to give notice of the death of her husband; to in
form the company o
f
the cause o
f his death; to supply it with a cer
tificate o
f





that the company may have full information touching not only the




the insured, that they may
make such inquiry as might be deemed proper b
y
them under the cir
cumstances to ascertain the truth o
f




Now, in this case, that duty was complied with b
y
the plaintiff,
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Davey was furnished to the company. The physician who gave that
certificate was William A. Rae, who was stated in the certificate to
have been a regular physician by profession, and that as such physi
cian he attended William A. Davey in his last illness, and was called
to attend him on or about the fourth of August, and continued to at
tend him until about the time of his death, which occurred on the
sixth of August, 1881. This, gentlemen, was not only a regular phy
sician, but he stood in very close relations to the insured. He was
his attending physician. Presumably he had knowledge of the cause
of his death. He certainly was familiar with the circumstance of
his death. Now, in this certificate he is asked to say what occasioned
the last illness of the insured; or, to give the question in its exact
words, “Was his last illness occasioned, or had his general health
been impaired, by any pernicious habits?” The answer to that ques
tion is: “He was in the habit of using stimulants and a great deal of
tobacco; probably they impaired his health.” Now there is at least
a suggestive inference that the habit and use of stimulants had some
thing to do with the cause of this man's death. Although, as you
have heard through the progress of this trial, this certificate is not to
be taken as evidence of the truth of the fact stated here, it is proper
to be taken into consideration by this company, to whom it must be
furnished for their consideration in ascertaining the truth touching
the circumstances of the death of the insured; and here is a sugges
tion which is certainly entitled to weight, in so far as it may afford a
full and complete justification of the course this company has taken
in making inquiry as to the cause of death, and in insisting that its
liability, in view of the information gathered, shall be determined by
the proper tribunal. We say, therefore, that there is no ground
whatever for any reflection upon the course taken by this company
in resisting the demand of the plaintiff for the amount of this policy,
but it has properly come here before a jury of the country to submit
to it such evidence as it has been able to gather, in view of the inti
mation given by the family physician of the deceased,—to submit to
a jury such information as it could gather touching the circumstances
of the death of this man, in order that an impartial jury may be able
to decide betwen these parties whether the insured has committed a
violation of the contract which he stipulated to observe and keep.
And in this connection you have the testimony of Dr. Rae in the
court before you, in which he substantially reaffirms what he said
in the certificate. Although he says that he was not certain, and
could not be as to the cause of this man's death, yet in view of the
doubt, because there was no autopsy, no post mortem examination,
yet he stated he entertained the impressions which are stated in the
certificate of death which he furnished to the company. And you
have testimony produced here by witnesses called on behalf of the
company to testify as to the habits and course of life of Mr. Davey,
principally at Alexandria bay, during a number of years that he was
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in the habit of visiting there. You have also the testimony of physi
cians who were present at his death, one of them, (who was not full
fledged at the time, but graduated afterwards,) Dr. Bruce, who detailed
to you what he saw in the last illness of Mr. Davey. He was present
in the room and waited upon him, and you have his opinion as the
cause of his death. You also have the opinion of Dr. Watson, who
seems to be a very candid and fair and intelligent physician. He
details to you fully the symptoms he observed in the case of this
man, and what occurred in the course of the visits he made to him
in the last days of his life, and you have his opinion also as to the
cause of his death. You have also the testimony of a number of wit
nesses, covering a period of about seven or eight years, who were
with Mr. Davey in his visits at Alexandria bay, and who told you what
they saw of his habits in the latter part of his life. Now, all this
is produced by the defendant to satisfy you that Mr. Davey committed
a breach of the condition referred to in the third clause of this policy,
and a violation of which he stipulated should be attended by a for
feiture of this contract. On the other hand, you have rebuttal testi
mony produced by the plaintiff as to the habits and course of life and
éondition of health of Mr. Davey for a period of seven, eight, ten, or
fifteen years before his death. That is furnished by the family rela
tions of Mr. Davey, and by those who were accustomed to see him
frequently, and who say they are familiar with his habits of life.
All this must be taken into consideration by you, gentlemen of the
jury, and from it all you must deduce your conscientious conclusions
as to the fact which is established. Does it satisfy you, taking it al
together, that Mr. Davey, after the date of this policy, had become so
far intemperate as to impair his health, and indulge in the use of al
coholic liquors to such an extent as to impair his health or induce
delirium tremens? If it does so satisfy you, the defendant has made
out his case; if it fails to convince you, why the plaintiff is entitled
to recover the amount of this policy.
Now, gentlemen, it remains only to explain to you the meaning of
this condition in the policy of insurance, and that I can do by simply
reading what I have written here in answer to the prayer of instruc
tions presented by counsel:
“(1) By the terms of the policy in this case, the application therein men
tioned is made part of it; the answers in the application are warranties, and
if any answer is untrue the warranty is broken and the policy is void.”
I substantially affirm that point in what I have already stated.
“(2) The agreement of the parties that the statements in the application
are true, and their falsity in any respect should avoid the policy, removes the
question of their materiality from the consideration of the court and jury, or
either of them.”
I substantially affirm that.
“(3) If the jury believe that the answer to question No. 6 in the appli
cation for insurance, as to whether the party had ever been addicted to the
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excessive or intemperate use of any alcoholic stimulant or opium, or whether
he uses any of them often or daily, was false or untrue, the policy issued upon
the application is void, and their verdict must be for the defendant.”
That is affirmed.
“(4) The condition of the policy to the effect that if William A. Davey shall
become so far intemperate as to impair his health, or induce delirium tremens.
etc., is a condition subsequent, and the breach of it renders the policy null and
void, as provided in the eighth section thereof.”
That is affirmed.
“(5) If the jury find that the insured became so far intemperate as to im
pair his health, the policy became null and void except as provided in the
eighth section.”
That is affirmed.
“(6) If the jury find that the insured became so far intemperate as to in
duce delirium tremens, the policy became null and void, subject to the eighth
section thereof.”
That is also affirmed.
“(7) The words “impair his health are to be taken in their ordinary
meaning, and mean simply impair his health.”
That is also affirmed.
“(8) The impairment of health referred to need not be a permanent im
pairment of health in order to avoid the policy.”
The impairment of health contemplated by this condition of the
policy is not necessarily permanent or irremediable, nor is it the
temporary indisposition or disturbance usually resulting from a
drunken debauch, but it is the development of disease, or the im
pairment of constitutional vigor, by the use of intoxicating beverages
in such a degree and for such a time as is ordinarily understood to
constitute intemperance. -
“(9) The expression in the policy, became so far intemperate as to impair
his health,” does not mean habitual intemperance; but an act of intemperance
producing impairment of health is within the condition of the policy, and
renders the policy null and void except as therein provided.”
This instruction is refused. The words of the condition are to be
expounded according to the common and popular acceptation of their
meaning. In this sense of them a single excessive indulgence in ac
coholic liquors is not intemperate, but there must be such frequency
in their use, continued for a longer or shorter period, as indicates as
injurious addiction to such indulgence.
“(10) If the jury find that the illness of William A. Davey at Alexandria
bay in the summer of 1881, which resulted in his death, was occasioned by
the use of alcoholic liquors, the policy was null and void except as therein pro
vided in the eighth section.
“(11) If the jury find that the illness of William A. Davey at Alexandria
bay, in the summer of 1881, which resulted in his death, was not occasioned
wholly by the use of alcoholic liquors, but that the use of the same contributed
to said illness, his health was impaired by said liquors, and the policy is null
and void, except as provided in the eighth section.”
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These points are answered together. If the jury find that the ill
ness of William A. Davey at Alexandria bay in the summer of 1881,
which resulted in his death, was caused, either wholly or partially,
by the intemperate use of alcoholic liquors, as explained in answer to
the ninth prayer of the defendant, the policy was thereby avoided, ex
cept as therein provided in section 8.
“(12) If the jury find that the saidWilliam A. Davey drank alcoholic liquors
at Alexandria bay to the extent testified to by the witnesses for the defense,
and the effect of the same was to impair his health in any degree, the policy
is void, except as provided in the eighth section.”
The jury must consider the testimony on both sides touching the
habits, course of life, and condition of W. A. Davey at Alexandria
bay, and if they are satisfied that they became so far intemperate, as
before explained, and that he there indulged his injurious taste as to
impair his health in any degree, the policy is void, except as provided
in the eighth section.
Now, gentlemen, there are two questions for your consideration
here, two branches of inquiry to which you must devote yourself to
decide this case for the plaintiff or defendant. In the first place, was
the question which I have read to you, No. 6, truthfully or untruth
fully answered at the time the application was made out for this in
surance? If the evidence satisfies you that before that time Mr.
Davey was addicted, or had been addicted, to the excessive or intem
perate use of any alcoholic stimulants or opium, or he was at the
time in the habit of using any of these often or daily,–if the evidence
satisfies your conscience that the answer, his denial of his addiction
to such habit, or such daily or frequent use of alcoholic liquor or
opium, is untrue, why it is your duty to find against the plaintiff. If
you are not satisfied, however, then, so far as that ground of defense
is concerned, why the defendant's case will fall. In the next place,
you will consider the habits and course of the life of Mr. Davey after
the execution and delivery of this policy of insurance. Did he become
so far intemperate as to impair his health or induce delirium tremens?
Did he become intemperate in the sense which I have explained to
you in the answer to the defendant's prayer of instructions, and was
his health impaired by such intemperance? If there is sufficient
proof to satisfy you that this condition of the policy was broken by
the habits and course of life of Mr. Davey after the execution of the
policy, and his indulgence contributed to his death, then the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover. As you consider the proofs on both sides
touching these two branches of the case, your verdict will be for the
plaintiff or defendant.
It is suggested by the counsel for the defendant, in his address to
the jury, that if you are satisfied that this last condition of the policy
was violated, the defendant is entitled to a general verdict in its favor.
While it is true, gentlemen of the jury, that this violation of the con
dition of the policy does not work an entire forfeiture of it
,
but there
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is a provision here for certain compensation,-the value of a paid-up
policy for such amount as the premium would purchase,_yet you have
no evidence before you as to the value of such policy, and although
the plaintiff might be entitled to recover such sum, yet, under the
state of the evidence here, if you are satisfied that the defendant has
made out it
s defense, why you could not find anything more than
nominal damages for the plaintiff. We do not know the value of
such a policy. It may be worth only six cents, or it may be worth a
thousand dollars. You are to judge of the evidence, and cannot in
dulge in any speculation as to the value provided for b
y
this policy
in favor of the insured, if the condition of the policy has been vio
lated; so that, if you are satisfied that upon that ground the defense
has been made out, your verdict will be for the plaintiff for nominal
damages.
Mr. Strong. With reference to the last point that your honor has
stated, I desire simply to say, on behalf of the company, that we do not





that subject, and if the




his intemperate habits, the condi
tions o
f
the policy have been broken, which, however, would give the
plaintiff a right to a paid-up policy for a certain amount, we are per
fectly willing to have that amount ascertained afterwards.
The Court. That is altogether voluntary. I suppose that, having
brought suit, the plaintiff has sued for all he is entitled to recover on
this policy, and a verdict may stand in the way of that payment.
Mr. Keasbey. Such result may be moulded under the direction of
the court, and the amount may be ascertained, I suppose, by refer
ence or consent.
Mr. Strong. Shall I call your honor's attention to one or two points
now, o
r
after the jury have retired 2 It is to take one or two excep





The Court. I simply followed the example of your learned asso
ciate. He spoke o
f that—counsel on both sides spoke of the habit o
f
daily use.
Mr. Strong. I should like to have an exception to that portion of
the charge. Then, as to the point raised in regard to the doctor's cer
tificate, the court stated that the jury is not to take that as evidence.
We desire to except to that.
The Court. The jury have that; and in regard to that I said that
while it is not to be taken as independent evidence of the facts set
forth therein, it
s
contents were recited b
y
Dr. Rae in his examination
before the jury.
Mr. Strong. It is simply to save the point we made in the course
o
f
the trial, in which we thought, it being furnished and offered b
y
the plaintiff, it was evidence, and we wish to save that point.
The Court. You took the exception at that time. The evidence is
before the jury. You objected then to my statement that it was not
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to be taken as independent evidence of the facts set forth in it
. I
said it was not to be taken as independent evidence, but is to be taken
in connection with the testimony of Dr. Rae. I cannot see that there
is any ground for exception at all. It is evidence in connection with
Dr. Rae's testimony, and the jury, of course, must attach such weight
to it as they may deem proper, in view of Dr. Rae's affirmation or
reaffirmation of the truth of that certificate.
Mr. Strong. Will your honor be good enough to give us an excep
tion to the refusal to charge as prayed for 2
The Court. You may except to each one of the answers as you
choose. Note them now.
Mr. Strong. There are two or three that your honor refused to
charge. We pray exceptions.
The Court. They are in writing. The first seven points I affirmed
without qualification, and the rest are answered in writing. Note
your exception.
Mr. Strong. Then, as to the eighth, the permanent impairment of
health. We except to that. Also as to the ninth, which your honor
refused to charge. We except to that, and to the charge as given
upon that subject. We pray separate exceptions, o
f course, on all
these points.
The Court. You may note the exception on each point.
The jury then retired, and after remaining out about 25 hours.
returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of the policy,
with interest.
There are many interesting questions presented in the above case, in con
nection with which we may be permitted to note other cases in which like
questions have been discussed.
In the particular case the court was asked to give the following instruc
tion: The expression in the policy, “became so far intemperate as to impair
his health,” does not mean habitual intemperance; but an act o
f intemper
ance producing impairment o
f
health is within the condition of the policy,
and renders the policy null and void except as therein provided. This in
struction, it will be not.ced, the court declined to give, declaring that the
words o
f
the condition were to be expounded according to the common and
popular acceptation o
f their meaning; and that in this sense o
f
them a sin
gle excessive indulgence in alcoholic liquors was not intemperate, but there
must have been such frequency in their use, continued for a longer or shorter
period, as indicated an injurious addiction to such indulgence.
In Bennecke v. Ins. Co." Mr. Justice FIELD, speaking for the supreme
court o
f
the United States, said: “The question was as to the habits o
f
the
insured. His occasional use of intoxicating liquors did not render him a man
o
f intemperate habits, nor would an exceptional case o
f
excess justify the ap
plication o
f
this character to him. An attack of delirium tremens may some
times follow a single excessive indulgence. * * * When we speak of
the habits o
f
a person, we refer to his customary conduct, to pursue which
h
e has acquired a tendency from frequent repetition o
f
the same acts. It
1 105 U. S. 350.
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would be incorrect to say that a man has a habit of anything from a single
act. A habit of early rising, for example, could not be affirmed of one be
cause he was once seen on the streets in the morning before the sun had
risen; nor could intemperate habits be imputed to him because his appearance
and actions on that occasion might indicate a night of excessive indulgence.
The court did not, therefore, err in instructing the jury that, if the habits of
the insured, “in the usual, ordinary, and every-day routine of his life were
temperate,” the representations made are not untrue, within the meaning of
the policy, although he may have had an attack of delirium tremens from an
exceptional overindulgence. It could not have been contemplated, from the
language used in the policy, that it should become void for an occasional ex
cess by the insured, but only when such excess had, by frequent repetitions,
become a habit.” -
In Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.1 the policy of insurance was conditioned to
be void if either of the answers to the following questions was false or un
true: Has the party whose life is to be insured ever been intemperate? Is
the party now of correct and temperate habits? The answer to the first
question was in the negative, and that to the second was in the affirmative.
The trial court told the jury that these questions were not whether the in
sured was ever drunk or whether he ever used intoxicating liquors, but
whether he was ever intemperate; that is
,
whether, a
t any period o
f
his life,
his usual and daily habits were such as to constitute and render him what is
known as an intemperate man,—a man habitually under the influence o
f in
to cicating liquor. This was held error, and the judgment was reversed.
Mr. Justice JoHNSON, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “An oc
casional excess in the use of intoxicating liquor does not, it is true, constitute
a habit o
r
make a man intemperate, within the meaning of this policy; but
if the habit has been formed, and is indulged in, of drinking to excess and
becoming intoxicated, whether daily and continuously or periodically, with
sober intervals o
f greater or less length, the person addicted to such a habit
cannot be said to be o
f temperate habits, within the meaning of this policy.
In view of the fact that the evidence strongly tended to show that it was the
habit o
f
the insured to indulge to excess a
t frequent times, and did not tend
to show a case o
f daily or continuous state of intoxication, this charge was
clearly misleading. From it the jury might well understand, and, in view
o
f
the whole evidence, we think may reasonably have understood, that Charles
Rief was of correct and temperate habits, although it was his habit to get
drunk periodically and frequently, with sober intervals o
f longer or shorter
duration. The habit o
f using intoxicatlng liquors to excess is the result o
f
indulging a natural or acquired appetite, by continued use, until it becomes a






drunkenness. Within the purview o
f
these questions
it must have existed at some previous time, or at the date of the application;
but it is not essential to its existence that it should be continuously practiced,
o
r
that the insured should be daily and habitually under the influence o
f
liquor. Where the general habits o
f
a man are either abstemious o
r temper
ate, an occasional indulgence to excess does not make him a man o
f intem
perate habits; but if the habit is formed of drinking to excess, and the appe
tite for liquor is indulged to intoxication, either constantly o
r periodically, no
one will claim that his habits are temperate, though he may be duly sober for
longer o
r
shorter periods in the intervals between the times o
f
his debauches.”
In Swick v. Home Life Ins. Co.,” the case being before Justice DiLLON and
Justice TREAT, the jury were instructed as follows: “Now, as to the question
respecting intoxicating liquors. These relate to the habits of the party. The
applicant stated that he had never been addicted to the excessive o
r intem






perate use of alcoholic stimulants. This is not a statement that he had never
been addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors at all, but a statement that
he had never been addicted to the excessive and intemperate use of them;
and it is untrue if Henry had, and only in case he had, been addicted to the
excessive or intemperate use of alcoholic stimulants. The application, in an
swer to other questions, stated that his habits were uniformly and strictly
sober and temperate, and that he did not habitually use intoxicating drinks
as a beverage. These questions and answers, you will perceive, relate to
the habits of the party in that respect. If the company did not intend to
insure any person who used intoxicating liquors at all, it would be very easy
to ask such a question. But they have not done so. The occasional use of
intoxicating liquors by the applicant would not make these answers untrue;
nor would they be rendered untrue by any use of intoxicating drinks which
did not make his habits those of a man not uniformly and strictly sober and
temperate, or which did not amount to habitual use of such drinks as a bev
erage.”
In Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Foley the court sustained as a good in
struction one which was to the following effect: If the jury finds that the
habits of the insured at the time of, or at any time prior to, the application
were not temperate, then the answer made by him to the questions, “Are you a
man of temperate habits? Have you always been so?” were untrue, and the
policy was void; but if the jury finds that his habits, in the usual, ordinary,
and every-day routine of life, were temperate, then such representations were
not untrue within the meaning of the policy, although they may find that he
had an attack of delirium tremens resulting from an exceptional indulgence
in drink prior to the issuance of the policy.
In Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.2 it was declared that the
terms “sober” and “temperate” were to be understood in their ordinary sense;
that they did not imply total abstinence; that a moderate and temperate use
of alcoholic liquor is consistent with sobriety, but if used to such an extent as
to produce frequent intoxication the applicant could not be considered sober
and temperate.
In Holterhoff v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,” where a policy of life in
surance contained a provision that in case the assured should die by reason of
intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors the policy should be void,
it was laid down that death must be the natural and proximate result of in
temperance from the use of intoxicating liquors. And the following charge
was sustained: “A habit, then, as generally understood, and as defined by
lexicographers, is a disposition or condition of the mind or body, a tendency
or aptitude for the performance of certain actions acquired by custom, or a
frequent repetition of the same acts. Habit is that which is held or retained,
—the effect of custom or frequent repetition. Hence we speak of good habits
and bad habits. Frequent drinking of spirits leads to habits of intemper
ance, etc. Adopting this interpretation of the phrase used in the present in
stance, and applying it to the state of facts as claimed to be proven, I have to
say to the jury that if they find from the evidence that at the time the ap
plication was made, or subsequently, the deceased had an appetite for intoxi
cating drinks to such an extent that a single indulgence necessarily insti
gated him to a repetition of it
,
and led him into what have been called “sprees,”
and these sprees were frequent, and rendered him incapable o
f controlling his
appetite while they continued, then, although there were intervals during
which he remained entirely sober, there was such a repetition of acts o
f drink
ing as amounted to a habit.”
In Miller v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co.4 it was held that evidence that the
plaintiff's decedent died from a cause occasioned or produced by an excess
"11 Fed. Rep. 706. ’9 Fed. Rep. 249. "3 Ins. Law J. 854. 434 Iowa, 222.
DAWEY v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO. 493
ive use of intoxicating liquors, would support the defense that he died from
intemperance. The policy contained a condition making it void if the person
insured should die “by reason of intemperance from the use of intoxicating
liquors.” In one of his debauches, having passed several days at a saloon
drinking, he was taken home, a physician was called, and he was found to be
suffering from delirium tremens. In his delirium he escaped from those hav
ing charge of him and ran through the streets in inclement weather, in his
underclothes. This brought on congestion of the lungs and resulted in death.
The court held there could be no recovery upon the policy.
In Knecht v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., the policy contained a provision like
this: If any of the statements or declarations made in the application for
this policy, upon the faith of which this policy is issued, shall be found in
any respect untrue, then, and in every such case, this policy shall be null
and void. In his application the applicant had declared “that he does not
now, nor will he, practice any pernicious habit, which obviously tends to the
shortening of life.” It appeared in evidence that at the time of making the
application the applicant was of correct and temperate habits, but that some
years afterwards he became addicted to the use of intoxicating drinks, and
was finally attacked with delirium tremens, from which attack he died. The
court held that the policy was not invalidated. The clause of the application
above alluded to, it was said, evidently referred to a state of things existing
at the time the policy was issued, and as such contained no untrue statement;
his declaration as to his future intentions not being false at the time it was
made.
In Gartside v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.” it was held that where an
insured person was shown to have been intemperate after the policy of insur
ance was issued, the presumption was that he became so after the date of the
olicy.p
Hºoda Fellows' Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rohkoppº the policy was condi
tioned to be void if the insured “should become so far intemperate as to se
riously or permanently impair his health, or induce delirium tremens.” It
appeared in evidence that the insured had become habitually intemperate, and
had been so for years. It was held that this fact, standing by itself, was of no
account. It was necessary to show in addition that his health had been seri
ously or permanently impaired thereby.
In Hartwell v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co.” the supreme court of Louisi
ana held that a policy of life insurance would be annulled when the insured
had made misrepresentations to the insurer as to his habits of drinking, al
though he himself, in making the declarations, may have acted in good faith,
and not have intended any deception.
In Shader v. Railway Passenger Assurance Co." an accidental insurance
policy contained a clause providing that no claim should be made thereunder
where the death or injury may have happened while the insured was, or in
consequence of his having been, under the influence of intoxicating drink.
It appeared in evidence that he had been killed by a pistol shot; and the
court held that if death occurred while he was under the influence of intox
icating drink, that fact alone avoided the policy, without regard to the ques
tion whether that condition was the natural and reasonable cause of death, or
in any manner contributed thereto. HENRY WADE ROGERs.
190 Pa. St. 118. 894 Pa. St. 59. *66 N. Y. 441.
*8 Mo. App. 593. *11 Ins. Law J. 897.
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MoTION For A NEw TRIAL–JURORs JUDGES OF THE FACTs.
A motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the
weight of evidence, should not be granted if it appears that the verdict, though
unexpected, could by possibility have been given consistently with facts in the
case and the court’s instructions.
On Application for Rule to Show Cause.
A. Q. Keasbey, for the motion.
John Linn, contra.
Nixon, J. This is an application for a rule to show cause why a
new trial should not be granted upon the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of evidence. See ante, 482. It rarely happens
that a court is justified in setting aside the action of a jury on issues
of fact, in the absence of proof of fraud or palpable mistake, where
there is any evidence to sustain the verdict. A trial by jury is the
constitutional right of the American citizen, and courts may not in
fringe upon this right by undertaking to nullify the acts of the jurors
by setting aside their deliberate judgment in cases where the judges,
under the evidence, would have reached a different conclusion. It is .
conceded that the verdict rendered in this case was not expected, but
there is one view of the facts upon which it may probably be sus
tained. In construing the provisions of the policy of insurance on
which the suit was brought, the court instructed the jury that they
had the right to hold that proof of a single instance of the excessive
use of alcoholic liquors, although it resulted in death, should not be
regarded as the intemperance referred to in the policy, by which the
health of the insured was impaired. The jury may have regarded
the proof of the free use of brandy and gin on the night of the sick
ness which terminated in death as an exceptional case, growing out
of the surrounding condition and circumstances, and may not have
given as much importance to the testimony of drinking at other times
as the defendants were disposed to do.
We have carefully read the testimony, and do not perceive how any
additional light can be shed on the case by granting the rule to show
cause, and the application is therefore refused.
